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In this viewpoint,
Holderness examines the case for preemption
of states’ workarounds of the federal state and
local tax deduction cap.
In late 2017 the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L.
115-97) was passed into law. Controversy
instantly ensued. One major controversy
revolves around the capping of the Internal
Revenue Code section 164 state and local tax
deduction at $10,000 per taxpayer (the SALT
1
cap). Viewed by many blue states as an attack
on their citizens, the SALT cap has spurred
counterattacks in the form of state legislation
designed to provide taxpayers with an avenue
to counter the effects of the SALT cap (the SALT
2
cap workarounds). While others have and are
considering the effectiveness of the SALT cap

workarounds, this essay explores a more basic
question: do the states have the power to lob
such counterattacks and facilitate taxpayers’
federal tax avoidance? The answer is more
nuanced than it might first appear; unlike
individual tax avoidance actions, the states’
actions raise the specter of federal preemption.
The U.S. Constitution provides that federal
law is the supreme law of the land; it preempts
conflicting state law.4 Therefore, it would seem
that the SALT cap workarounds are invalid
because they intentionally frustrate the operation
of the SALT cap. However, the Supreme Court has
often hesitated to find that federal law has
implicitly preempted conflicting state law when
the conflict is merely incidental to the legitimate
exercise of a traditional state power. What’s more,
the primary SALT cap workarounds rely on
IRC section 170’s deduction for charitable
contributions to achieve their goal, arguably
advancing the policy behind that part of the
federal tax law. Do these two facts shield the
workarounds from preemption? Where a state
specifically targets the federal law with
workarounds that are more formalistic than
substantive exercises of state powers, the
answer appears to be “no.” The more
substantive the state’s action, the more likely it
is to pass a preemption challenge. This may leave
room for pre-TCJA state programs that operate
similarly to the SALT cap workarounds to stand
while new workarounds fall.
The essay proceeds in four parts. Part I
provides basic background on the SALT cap

1

E.g., Richard Rubin, “As Treasury Targets Workarounds to Tax Law,
Impact May Extend Beyond High-Tax States,” The Wall Street Journal,
June 27, 2018; and Alan Rappeport and Jim Tankersley, “I.R.S. Warns
States Not to Circumvent State and Local Tax Cap,” The New York Times,
May 23, 2018.
2

E.g., Paige Jones, “Legislature Passes Nation’s First SALT Cap
Workaround,” State Tax Notes, Apr. 9, 2018, p. 158; and Lauren Loricchio,
“Second State Enacts SALT Cap Workaround,” State Tax Notes, May 14,
2018, p. 746.

3

See, e.g., Notice 2018-54, 2018 24 IRB 750 (IRS notice explaining that
the agency is looking into the legal effect of the workarounds); Joseph
Bankman et al., “State Responses to Federal Tax Reform: Charitable Tax
Credits,” State Tax Notes, Apr. 30, 2018, p. 433; and Andy Grewal, “The
Charitable Contribution Strategy: An Ineffective SALT Substitute.”
4

See U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 (the supremacy clause).
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workarounds, focusing on those that take
advantage of the federal deduction for charitable
contributions. Part II then outlines the case for
federal preemption of the workarounds, first
exploring federal preemption doctrine and
obstacle preemption in particular. The standard
for obstacle preemption is murky, but generally
speaking, state law that frustrates federal policy is
preemptable, though a presumption against
preemption can save state laws. This part then
analyzes the SALT cap workarounds under the
obstacle preemption case law, concluding that
the workarounds are squarely within the aim of
obstacle preemption where they represent
formalistic actions designed solely to frustrate the
operation of the SALT cap. Part III contrasts that
analysis with a look at existing state programs
similar to the workarounds. Those existing
programs stand a greater chance of being saved
by the presumption against preemption than the
SALT cap workarounds. Finally, Part IV
concludes.
I. The States’ SALT Cap Workarounds
The SALT cap workarounds have taken
numerous forms, though three are most
prominent. The first, which I will focus on in this
article given its popularity, involves providing a
large credit against state taxes for donations to
state-sponsored charitable organizations. The
idea behind this workaround is that the donation
to the organization will generate a federal tax
deduction for the taxpayer under IRC section 170,
and the organization will be able to spend the
money as the state would have if the payment had
been in the form of a tax payment rather than a
5
deductible charitable donation. The remaining
two workarounds involve shifting state income
taxes to payroll taxes paid by businesses (which
6
remain deductible) and providing for deductible
taxes on passthrough entities accompanied with
7
offsetting individual state income tax credits.

The states enacting the SALT cap
workarounds have made their intentions clear:
they do not like the SALT cap and want to provide
their taxpayers with the means to get around it.
For instance, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo (D)
asked state lawmakers to “change our tax code in
a way that thwarts [the federal] attack” that is the
SALT cap.8 New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy (D)
described the SALT cap as “a de facto tax hike on
countless New Jersey households” before
providing that “we’re going to give residents back
9
some of this much-needed tax deduction.”
The effectiveness of these workarounds
remains to be seen. The IRS has promised
guidance on whether it will respect their form for
federal income tax purposes.10 Many have argued
that the charitable contributions in particular
should not qualify taxpayers for the federal tax
deduction for charitable contributions because
they are getting something of value in return: a
11
reduction of their state taxes. Others counter that
states have long offered tax reductions for
donations to some organizations and that the IRS
has allowed taxpayers to claim full federal tax
12
deductions for those same donations. For
example, the Georgia qualified education expense
tax credit offers eligible taxpayers tax credits for
donations to organizations that provide
scholarships for children who attend private
13
schools. Assuming these latter arguments are
correct and the SALT cap workarounds
technically function as designed, are they still
problematic? Under federal preemption doctrine,
the answer is yes.
II. Preemption and the SALT Cap Workarounds
Because the SALT cap workarounds are state
laws rather than individual actions, they raise the

8

Jeanne Sahadi, “How New York’s Governor Wants to Get Around
the SALT Cap,” CNN Money, Jan 16, 2018.
9

Dustin Racioppi, “Help for NJ’s High Property Taxes? Phil Murphy
Signs Workaround to Trump Tax Code Rewrite,” NorthJersey.com, May
4, 2018.
10
5

See Bankman et al., supra note 3.

6

See Daniel Hemel, “Repeal of the SALT Deduction for Income Taxes
Might Not Raise a Cent, Whatever Source Derived,” Medium.com, Nov.
9, 2017.
7

See Amy Hamilton, “Legislature Approves Passthrough SALT
Workaround,” State Tax Notes, May 11, 2018, p. 723.

738

Notice 2018-54, 2018-24 IRB 750.

11

E.g., Peter L. Faber, “Do Charitable Contributions Avoid the TCJA
SALT Deduction Limit?” State Tax Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 309.
12

See Bankman et al., supra note 3.

13

Ga. Code Ann. section 48-7-29.16. A comprehensive list of such
preexisting programs can be found in the Appendix to Joseph Bankman
et al., supra note 3.

STATE TAX NOTES, AUGUST 20, 2018
For more State Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

SPECIAL REPORT

fundamental issue of preemption. The supremacy
clause of the U.S. Constitution declares that “the
Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
14
notwithstanding.” Simply put, when state law
conflicts with federal law, federal law wins. In a
watershed case for preemption doctrine,
15
McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John
Marshall described the impact and importance of
the supremacy clause on federal-state relations:
It is of the very essence of supremacy to
remove all obstacles to its action within its
own sphere, and so to modify every power
vested in subordinate governments, as to
exempt its own operations from their own
influence. This effect need not be stated in
terms. It is so involved in the declaration
of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it,
that the expression of it could not make it
16
more certain.
Determining when state law conflicts with
federal law is not quite so simple, however.17 The
next section explores the state of the doctrine,
focusing particularly on a form of preemption
known as obstacle preemption.18
A. Federal Preemption Doctrine
The various ways in which federal law might
preempt state law were recently described by the
Supreme Court in Murphy v. NCAA:
Our cases have identified three different
types of preemption — “conflict,”
“express,” and “field” — but all of them
work in the same way: Congress enacts a
law that imposes restrictions or confers
rights on private actors; a state law confers
rights or imposes restrictions that conflict

with the federal law; and therefore the
federal law takes precedence and the state
19
law is preempted.
Because the IRC does not expressly prohibit
states from imposing income taxes on their
residents, express preemption is not at issue
20
regarding the SALT cap workarounds. It is also
unlikely that Congress intended to occupy the
entire field of income tax law through the IRC, so
21
field preemption is also not at issue here. The
remaining type of preemption — conflict
preemption — may invalidate the SALT cap
workarounds.
Conflict preemption breaks down into two
forms: impossibility preemption and obstacle
preemption.22 Impossibility preemption requires
that it be “impossible for a private party to comply
23
with both state and federal requirements.” For
example, in Mutual Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Bartlett,
the Court found a state tort law affecting the
labelling of pharmaceuticals to be preempted by
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
because “it was impossible for Mutual to comply
with both its state-law duty to strengthen the
warnings on sulindac’s label and its federal-law
duty not to alter sulindac’s label.”24 This form of
preemption is not at issue in the current analysis
because it is not impossible for a taxpayer to
comply with both federal and state law.25
Thus, obstacle preemption remains. Obstacle
preemption looks to whether the state law at issue
26
frustrates the objectives of Congress. The
standard for obstacle preemption demands a
consideration of the “entire scheme of the
19

Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 584 U.S. __, at *2122 (2018) (internal citations omitted).
20

Express preemption occurs when the federal law expressly
prohibits overlapping state legislation. See id. at *22.
21

Field preemption occurs when the federal regime is so pervasive
that there is no room for additional state regulation. See id.
22

14

U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.

15

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

16

Id. at 427.

17

See, e.g., Gregory M. Dickinson, “An Empirical Study of Obstacle
Preemption in the Supreme Court,” 89 Neb. L. Rev. 682, 682 (2011) (“The
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence over the last few decades
has been unpredictable to say the least.”).
18

Obstacle preemption is also sometimes referred to as “purposes
and objectives” preemption. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring).

E.g., Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73
(2000) (“We will find preemption where it is impossible for a private
party to comply with both state and federal law, and where ‘under the
circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.’”) (internal citations omitted); and Arizona v.
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 400 (2012).
23

E.g., Mutual Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 480 (2013)
(internal citations omitted).
24
25
26

Id.
See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73.
Id.
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[federal] statute” in order to identify “its purpose
and intended effects”; if the state law frustrates
the operation of the federal statute or impedes the
“natural effect” of the statute, the state law must
yield.27 Though the standard appears to demand a
broad consideration of the federal law, the Court
often focuses on the particular parts of a larger
statutory regime that the state law conflicts with.28
As the Court has explained, “in assessing the
impact of a state law on the federal scheme, we
have refused to rely solely on the legislature’s
professed purpose and have looked as well to the
29
effects of the law.” Ultimately, whether the state
law presents a significant enough obstacle to the
30
federal law is a matter of judgment.
In performing this analysis, a court should
consider the provision at issue, its history, any
explanation of its objectives, and current views of
the preemptive effect of the provision.31 Also, the
state law must frustrate a significant objective of
the federal law; peripheral objectives are not the
32
concern. Finally, under the presumption against
preemption, a court avoids reading federal
statutes to intrude on traditional state powers,
33
such as taxation, “in the absence of a clear
indication that they do.”34 However, the
supremacy clause cannot be “evaded by
35
formalism”; a state cannot mask a direct assault
on federal law or policy through a formalistic
application of traditional state powers.
Often an obstacle preemption case involves a
state law that imposes burdens on a person

27

Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985).
28

E.g., Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483 (2013) (considering state law
conflict with beneficiary designation provisions of the Federal
Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.
at 400 (considering state law conflict with particular federal alienregistration requirements in the federal immigration law regime); and
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 330 (2011)
(considering whether state law conflicted with the provisions of
Standard 208 issued under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act).
29

See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 U.S. 88,
105-06 (1992).

beyond what federal law requires. For example, in
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc.,36 a state law
imposing state-level tort liability on car
manufacturers who did not install airbags in their
cars was found to frustrate the federal policy of
allowing manufacturers to choose between
installing airbags or automatic seatbelts in order
to meet safety standards.
However, in some cases, the state law at issue
has provided an avenue for a person to escape
federal burdens. For example, in Hillman v.
37
Maretta, the Court considered a challenge to a
Virginia law that held a former spouse liable for
insurance proceeds to whoever would have
received them under applicable law but for the
former spouse being designated the beneficiary.
That law conflicted with the Federal Employees’
Group Life Insurance Act, which provided that
insurance proceeds were to be paid to the
designated beneficiary first. The Virginia law did
not make it impossible for the federal law to
operate — the life insurance proceeds would still
be paid out to the designated beneficiary. Rather
the law conflicted with the federal law by
providing an avenue for those proceeds to be
stripped away from the designated beneficiary.
Observing that there was a presumption
against preemption in Hillman because the
“regulation of domestic relations is traditionally
the domain of state law,” the Court noted that the
state law must do “‘major damage’ to ‘clear and
substantial’ federal interests” before the state law
38
is preempted. The Court then began its analysis
by determining the nature of the federal interest,
which it described as ensuring that a duly named
beneficiary would receive the insurance proceeds
and be able to make use of them.39 The Court also
observed that it made no difference to the case
that the state law did not actually require the
transfer of proceeds but instead created a cause of
action enabling someone to effectuate such a
transfer. In the Court’s view, the Virginia law
“frustrates the deliberate purpose of Congress”
because it “displaces the beneficiary selected by

30

Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.

31

See Williamson, 562 U.S. at 330.

32

Id.

36

33

See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

37

34

E.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014); see also Wyeth
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
35

Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742 (2009).

740

38
39

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
Hillman, 569 U.S. 483.
Id. at 490-491.
Id. at 493-494.
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the insured . . . and places someone else in her
stead.”40 The Virginia law was preempted.
41
In Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing LLC, the
Court affirmed that Maryland’s efforts to work
around federal rates for electricity were
preempted because they conflicted with the rates
set by the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee.
Hughes is a narrow case concerning a specific area
42
of law — interstate electricity rates — but
indicates the Court’s discomfort with state actions
43
that intentionally undermine federal law. As the
Court observed:
States may not seek to achieve ends,
however legitimate, through regulatory
means that intrude on FERC’s authority
over interstate wholesale rates, as
Maryland has done here. See [Oneck Inc. v.
Learjet Inc., 575 U.S. __ (2015)]
(distinguishing between “measures aimed
directly at interstate purchasers and
wholesalers for resale, and those aimed at
44
subjects left to the states to regulate.”)
Obstacle preemption analysis can be murky,45
but as described, some guideposts do exist. First,
the state law in question must frustrate a
significant federal policy. Second, if that
frustration is only incidental to the state
exercising one of its fundamental powers, the
state law has a stronger chance of being permitted
to stand thanks to the presumption against
preemption.
B. The Case Against the SALT Cap Workarounds
In the case of the SALT cap workarounds, the
states are certainly reacting to the changes of the
TCJA, but are they frustrating federal policy? The

40

Id. at 494.

41

Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).

House Committee Report on the TCJA said the
following regarding the reasons for the SALT cap:
The Committee believes that scaling back
existing tax incentives, including the
deduction for State and local taxes, makes
the system simpler and fairer for all
families and individuals, and allows for
lower tax rates. The Committee further
believes that modification of this
provision to apply only to real property
taxes is consistent with streamlining the
tax code, broadening the tax base,
lowering rates, and growing the
economy.46
Though federal lawmakers did not provide
much further insight into the policy behind the
imposition of the SALT cap, there are numerous
possible policies that might be considered core to
the SALT cap such that they are substantial
enough for preemption analysis to come into play.
First, the TCJA as a whole was intended to
lower federal tax burdens and simplify filing by
limiting itemized deductions and pushing more
47
people into claiming the standard deduction.
The SALT cap workarounds do not necessarily
frustrate the goal of lowering federal tax burdens
as they further lower federal tax burdens, but the
Court has recognized that a “conflict in technique
can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress
48
erected as conflict in overt policy.” Also, the
TCJA did not seek to eliminate federal tax
burdens, but to lower them to a specific point. The
SALT cap workarounds frustrate that objective by
offering an avenue for lowering federal tax
burdens past the intended point. The
workarounds do conflict with the simplification
goal by offering taxpayers an avenue to claim
more itemized deductions, at least in the case of
the charitable contribution workarounds.
More specifically, the policy behind enacting
the SALT cap may have been to alter taxpayers’

42

Id. at 1299.

43

Cf. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736 (“Although States retain substantial
leeway to establish the contours of their judicial systems, they lack
authority to nullify a federal right or cause of action they believe is
inconsistent with their local policies.”).
44

Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298 (emphasis in original).

45

See Williamson, 562 U.S. at 342 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“That the
Court in Geier reached an opposite conclusion [than the one in this case]
reveals the utterly unconstrained nature of purposes-and-objectives preemption. There is certainly ‘considerable similarity between this case
and Geier.’”).

46

H.R. Rep. No. 115-409, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (115th Congress 20172018).
47

Id. (“H.R. 1, as reported by the Committee on Ways and Means,
makes comprehensive reforms to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to
provide tax relief and simplification to American families and
individuals so that they can keep more of what they earn and devote less
time and resources to filing their tax returns.”).
48

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 406 (2012) (citing Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971)).
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federal tax burdens as a way to reduce the
regressivity of the cap and the federal
subsidization of state taxes. The history and
commentary surrounding the SALT cap point
toward this purpose, as the SALT cap has long
49
been criticized on such grounds. Alternatively,
the policy behind implementing the cap may have
been more practical: to raise revenue to offset tax
cuts in other parts of the TCJA. Despite the
difficulty of determining the precise reason the
SALT cap was in the TCJA, this much is clear: the
implementation of the SALT cap could free up to
50
$1 trillion in the next 10 years.
The SALT cap workarounds clearly frustrate
these policies: They permit taxpayers to alter their
federal tax burdens, retain the regressivity of the
SALT cap, continue the federal subsidization of
state taxes, and reduce the revenue brought in by
the SALT cap.51 The blueprint for the preemption
case against the workarounds might even be
found in the earliest of cases, McCulloch v.
52
Maryland. Following the War of 1812, the United
States found itself in financial straits and
established the Second Bank of the United States
53
for support. In an act of protest against the bank,
Maryland attempted to tax it. The Court
determined that the tax imposed on the bank
“would abridge, and almost annihilate [the]
useful and necessary right of the [federal]
54
legislature to select its means.” The Maryland tax
was preempted.
However, preemption doctrine has evolved
since McCulloch, and, in the case of the SALT cap
workarounds, the states are exercising their
fundamental tax powers to achieve their goals.
The states are providing state tax benefits to
effectuate the workarounds, so perhaps they

should not be preempted. Though the
presumption against preemption often protects
state law in such circumstances, the presumption
is not absolute. Here, as in Hillman and Hughes,
the states are directly targeting the federal law
through the workarounds, significantly
damaging the case for the presumption to protect
the workarounds. Furthermore, the workarounds
appear to be an exercise in formalism: the states
are not advancing any state tax policy, they are
using their laws to offer a workaround to federal
tax policy. Preempting these types of state actions
is hardly a case of the federal government
encroaching on traditional state powers;
formalism cannot be used to avoid the supremacy
55
clause.
Even so, a state exercising its traditional
powers in this way does not prevent the federal
government from achieving its goals by simply
disregarding the state action for federal purposes.
A taxpayer can have a charitable deduction at the
state level and none at the federal level, and the
federal-state balance is hardly upset. In this line of
thinking, the state cannot frustrate the federal law
because it has no real power over the federal law.
It is true that Congress can disregard the state
actions for federal purposes, but Congress is not
required to explicitly do so in all instances.56 The
fact that there are forms of implied preemption is
proof of this proposition. If the congressional
intent was to enact a particular policy, then the
states should not be permitted to directly and
substantially frustrate that policy regardless of
the various remedies available to Congress. Not
forcing Congress to revisit its laws because of
57
state action is the basis of implied preemption. In
55

49

See Joseph J. Thorndike, “Tax History: The SALT Deduction Has
Always Been Hard to Defend — And to Kill,” Tax Notes, Oct. 9, 2017, p.
176 (detailing the history of the SALT cap and arguments for and against
it).
50

Id.

51

Cf. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000)
(“We used the metaphor of the bargaining chip to describe the
President’s control of funds valuable to a hostile country; here the state
Act reduces the value of the chips created by the federal statute. It thus
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”) (internal citations omitted).
52

McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316.

53

Andrew T. Hill, “The Second Bank of the United States,” Federal
Reserve History.
54

McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 419.

742

Haywood, 556 U.S. at 742.

56

See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387-88 (“A failure to provide for preemption
expressly may reflect nothing more than the settled character of implied
preemption doctrine that courts will dependably apply, and in any event
the existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy Clause does
not depend on express congressional recognition that federal and state
law may conflict. The State’s interference of congressional intent is
unwarranted here, therefore, simply because the silence of Congress is
ambiguous.”).
57

See Caleb Nelson, “Preemption,” 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 277-78 (2000)
(framing implied preemption as “an exercise in ‘imaginative
reconstruction’” which represents “an attempt to resolve preemption
questions in a way that the enacting Congress would have liked). As
Nelson notes, ascribing a purpose or intention to a particular Congress is
a difficult, if not impossible, task, id. at 280-282. This criticism is duly
noted, but given that the Supreme Court is willing to engage in the
discovery of congressional intent, the analysis here will proceed as the
Court does.
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other words, if express preemption was the only
form of preemption, then Congress would need to
account for all scenarios in which it intended to
preempt state law. Rather, implied preemption
recognizes that when Congress intends to enact a
particular policy, it can also be presumed to
intend not to permit the states to frustrate that
policy.58 Without implied preemption, Congress
would need to amend its statutes to preempt
conflicting state actions. The Court has indicated
that requiring Congress to amend its statutes
would be a substantial obstacle, though the
obstacle might be lessened when Congress
delegates authority to an agency to administer the
59
law.
C. Weaknesses in the Case
The preemption case against the SALT cap
workarounds is not without weaknesses. Two
major weaknesses of the argument are that the
workarounds rely on another provision of the IRC
for their effect and that the IRS is tasked with
administering the code.
That the workarounds rely on IRC section 170
to achieve their goals presents a hurdle for the
preemption case. As others have observed, section
170 demonstrates a federal purpose to encourage
charitable deductions to arms of state and local
60
governments. Therefore, at a minimum, the
SALT cap workarounds frustrate one part of the
federal tax code by advancing the purposes of
61
another part of the federal tax code. In a way, the
federal tax code is frustrating its own purposes
through the potentially conflicting goals of

62

sections 170 and 164. The SALT cap
workarounds merely expose that conflict, which
Congress should have to resolve.
The resolution of this issue may depend on
how narrowly a court construes a preemption
challenge (a challenge alleging conflict only under
section 164 and not the IRC at large would stand a
greater chance of success), but there is reason to
believe that a narrow challenge is appropriate.
First, the states have specifically targeted section
164, not the larger federal tax code, which may
counsel in favor of examining whether the states
have achieved that goal. Second, as noted, the
workarounds are highly formalistic, calling into
question whether the relabeling of the taxpayer’s
taxes to charitable deductions advances the
causes of section 170. Finally, it is not clear under
the preemption doctrine that advancing federal
interests is enough to overcome the frustration of
63
other federal interests. For example, in Arizona v.
United States, the Court found a state law
prohibiting illegal immigrants from seeking
employment was preempted despite the fact
that it “attempt[ed] to achieve one of the same
64
goals of federal law.” The law was preempted
because it conflicted with federal law in another
way — method of enforcement. If the goal of
obstacle preemption is to prevent federal-state
conflicts, there is reason to believe that covering a

62

Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. C.I.R., 972 F.2d 858, 868 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Easterbrook) (“Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code do not conflict
with ‘tax policy,’ as the Commissioner seems to believe. They are tax
policy and are to be enforced.”). Many thanks to Andy Grewal for this
citation.
63

58

See Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation Commission of
Kansas, 489 U.S. 493 (1989) (“Congress has the power under the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution to pre-empt state
law. Determining whether it has exercised this power requires that we
examine congressional intent. In the absence of explicit statutory
language signaling an intent to pre-empt, we infer such intent . . . where
the state law at issue conflicts with federal law.”).
59

See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs. Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 721 (1985) (“Our analysis would be somewhat different had
Congress not delegated to the FDA the administration of the federal
program. Congress, unlike an agency, normally does not follow, years
after the enactment of federal legislation, the effects of external factors
on the goals that the federal legislation sought to promote. Moreover, it
is more difficult for Congress to make its intentions known — for
example by amending a statute — than it is for an agency to amend its
regulations or to otherwise indicate its position.”).
60

See Bankman et al., supra note 3.

61

Many thanks to Kirk Stark for raising this point.

See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971) (“Any state legislation
which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid
by the Supremacy Clause.”); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at
406 (finding a state law that “attempts to achieve one of the same goals
of federal law” preempted under conflict preemption principles because
it conflicted with federal law in another way — method of enforcement);
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379 (“The conflicts [between state and federal law]
are not rendered irrelevant by the State’s argument that there is no real
conflict between the statutes because they share the same goals and
because some companies may comply with both sets of restrictions. The
fact of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means[.]”); and Gade
v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992)
(“To allow a State selectively to ‘supplement’ certain federal regulations
with ostensibly nonconflicting standards would be inconsistent with this
federal scheme of establishing uniform federal standards, on the one
hand, and encouraging States to assume full responsibility for
development and enforcement of their own OSH programs, on the
other.”).
64

Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. at 406 (finding a state law that “attempts to
achieve one of the same goals of federal law” preempted under conflict
preemption principles because it conflicted with federal law in another
way — method of enforcement).
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conflict with an advancement of other federal
goals would not achieve that goal.
Another major hurdle to the preemption case is
that the IRS has the authority to administer the IRC
and can revisit the law in light of the states’ actions.
Indeed, it has already stated that it will do so in this
case.65 That the IRS may issue guidance regarding
the SALT cap workarounds that advances the
federal tax law policy indicates that the
workarounds are not substantial obstacles to the
66
federal law. However, in Automated Medical
Laboratories, in which the Supreme Court indicated
that the administration of the law by an agency can
reduce the obstacle presented by conflicting state
law, the Food and Drug Administration was tasked
with substantial authority over setting standards
67
for the collection of blood plasma. The IRS has
significant authority over the IRC, but sections 170
and 164 define charitable contributions and taxes
with a degree of specificity that may indicate that
the IRS has less room to address the SALT cap
workarounds.
Finally, it is unclear when a preemption
challenge to the SALT cap workarounds would
become ripe. As laid out in Arizona v. United States,
the Court will not seek out conflicts when none
clearly exists; when uncertainty exists, the state law
must be given time to operate to uncover a conflict
68
with federal law. It may be that the SALT cap
workarounds do not create an actual conflict with
federal law, particularly if the IRS disregards their
form for federal tax purposes. In such a case, the
preemption analysis would be unnecessary.
III. Georgia on My Mind
What about the charitable deduction schemes
in place in a variety of states before the enactment
of the TCJA? If the SALT cap workarounds are
preempted, should the existing schemes also be
preempted? The answer is less clear for one reason.
Though these schemes substantively do frustrate
the federal law in a manner similar if not identical
to the SALT cap workarounds, they may be saved
by the presumption against preemption. If those

laws were not designed solely to target federal law,
then the presumption against preemption may
require a clear statement from Congress that it
intended to preempt these state programs when
enacting the TCJA with the SALT cap. No such
clear statement exists, so these programs might
withstand a preemption attack.
These programs may have been set up in large
part to permit alternative minimum tax payers to
avoid the disallowance of the section 164
69
deduction. If that were the sole motivation for the
earlier programs, there is nothing to distinguish
them from the SALT cap workarounds (except
perhaps the current rhetoric from the states
adopting the workarounds). However, given that
the existing programs had no substantive effect for
non-AMT payers before the enactment of the
70
TCJA, in comparison to the SALT cap
workarounds the purpose behind the programs
may be more credibly articulated as implementing
substantive state policies of supporting various
types of organizations, such as schools and
hospitals.71 In this case, the laws would not be a
mere formalistic application of traditional state
powers, and the presumption against preemption
might save them under the TCJA.
Admittedly, the line between some of the
existing state programs and the new SALT cap
workarounds under this analysis is razor thin. The
legal resolution may depend on which type of law
is challenged first, as it seems inequitable to
grandfather old programs while prohibiting the
new workarounds when both have the same
substantive effect (and when many of the old
programs are being marketed as means for
72
avoiding the SALT cap.)

69

See Carl Davis, “State Tax Subsidies for Private K-12 Education,”
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (Oct. 2016).
70

Because SALT deductions were uncapped and charitable
deductions were capped under prior law, these laws did little if anything
to incentivize federal tax avoidance. Furthermore, the value of the
deductions was the same for both, so the federal government likely was
indifferent as to which the taxpayer claimed.
71

65

See Notice 2018-54, 2018-24 IRB 750.

66

See supra note 59.

72

67

See Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. at 710.

68

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 415.
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See, e.g., Ala. Code section 16-6D-2(b) (describing the purpose of
multiple provisions, including some state tax credits, as “to advance the
benefits of local school and school system autonomy in innovation and
creativity by allowing flexibility from state laws, regulations, and
policies”).
See Carl Davis, “The Other SALT Cap Workaround: Accountants
Steer Clients Toward Private K-12 Voucher Tax Credits,” Institute on
Taxation and Economic Policy (June 2018) (cataloguing such efforts).
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IV. Conclusion
The case for preemption of the SALT cap
workarounds exists, even if it is not bulletproof.
How such a case would come out is murky, as
many preemption cases are. On the one hand,
states should not be encouraged or able to
intentionally frustrate federal policy that they
disagree with. In this instance, the clear
motivations behind the workarounds would seem
to bring them directly into the crosshairs of the
obstacle preemption doctrine. Should a state be
rewarded for explicitly intending to obscure
federal policy, no matter how repugnant it may be
to the state?
On the other hand, taxation is a fundamental
power of the states that should not be lightly
interfered with by the courts. If there is a
legitimate purpose to be found for enacting the
workarounds, it is more difficult to justify
preempting the state laws for their effects on
federal law. Certainly, states that did not have
these tax programs in place before the TCJA
should not be precluded from adopting them now
if the old programs remain effective. And though
Congress is not asked to explicitly provide for
preemption in every instance, it also should not be
given a blank pass for sloppy legislation that
created the loopholes that are being exploited. Is it
truly against federal policy for a state to assist a
taxpayer in taking advantage of another part of
the same statute? Perhaps the answer will come
down to who acted most poorly: the federal
government in enacting the TCJA or the states in
directly targeting that law with their
workarounds.


STATE TAX NOTES, AUGUST 20, 2018
For more State Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

745

© 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

SPECIAL REPORT

